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Whatever Happened to the Bismarckian Welfare State? 
From Labor Shedding to Employment-Friendly Reforms 
 
The paper challenges the widespread view that Bismarckian countries with a strong role of 
social insurance and labor market regulation are less successful than other employment 
regimes and hard to reforms. This has been true about a decade ago. But both the 
institutional set-up and the performance of BIsmarckian countries have changed 
fundamentally over the last years. The paper summarizes major reform dynamics in 
Bismarckian welfare states which had adopted a strategy of labor shedding in the 1970s and 
1980s to combat open unemployment. As this was associated with an increasing burden of 
non-wage labor costs, this triggered a sequence of more employment-oriented and more 
fundamental reforms that eventually helped overcome a low employment situation. The paper 
pursues the trajectory of reforms, shows the structural change in labor market performance 
and points out the achievements of past reforms, but also emphasizes the need for further 
action in terms of education and training, activation and employment opportunities for all 
working age people in these countries so that flexibility and security can be reconciled. 
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X.1 The adaptive capacity of the continental welfare state  
 
Is  the  welfare  state  fit  for  the  21st  century?  This  question  has  haunted  European  policy 
makers and researchers for over a decade. Sluggish growth and weak job creation around the 
turn of the new millennium has not only given way to a fierce ideological battle between 
different  socio-economic  ‘models’,  triggering  political  strife  and  separating  antagonistic 
advocacy coalitions – but also contributed to a strand of analytical literature pointing out the 
structural  impediments  to  ‘modernize’  Continental  European  and  Mediterranean  welfare 
states and make them both more employment friendly and sustainable (see e.g. Scharpf and 
Schmidt 2000). The Bismarckian version of the European social model was pitted against a 
false stereotype of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model of capitalism, allegedly a ‘free market without a 
safety net’, producing high levels of poverty and inequality, but also against Scandinavian 
welfare states with universal benefits and strong public services in education, child-care and 
active labor market policies.  
Rather  than  extrapolating  policy  recipes  from  recent  economic  performance,  urging 
European  OECD  members  to  recast  their  social  market  economies  along  the  lines  of 
American capitalism, a more illuminating way to understand recent reform dynamics is to 
contextualize  existing  social  policy  repertoires  and  reform  dynamics  in  the  face  of  the 
changing  economic  and  technological  challenges  and  evolving  social  and  demographic 
structures.  As  shown  in  the  various  chapters  of  this  book,  the  striking  intensity  and  the 
comprehensive character of social and economic policy reform across the majority of the so-
called  Bismarckian  welfare  regimes,  including  the  six  founding  EU  Member  States  of 
Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries, together with the later entrants Spain and 
Austria as well as the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland) 
and  Switzerland,  since  the  mid-1990s,  is  very  much  at  odds  with  a  prevalent  image  of  a 
‘frozen welfare landscape’ in the academic literature. Most important, the substantive extent 
of welfare redirection across a large number of Member States of the European Union (EU) 
adds up to the momentum of substantive policy change and goes far beyond the popular 
concepts of ‘retrenchment’ and ‘roll-back.’ But to say that the Bismarckian welfare states, as 
compared the Anglo-Irish and Scandinavian welfare regimes, are far from sclerotic is not to 
say that they are in good shape.  
Today four sets of challenges confront policy makers with the imperative to redirect the 
welfare effort, to redesign institutions and to elaborate on new principles of social justice. 
From without, in the first place, international competition is challenging the redistributive 
scope and de-commodifying power of the national welfare state. Many academic observers 
believe that the increase in cross-border competition in the markets for money, goods and 
services has substantially reduced the room for maneuver of national welfare states (Scharpf   3
1999).  Economic  internationalization  constrains  countercyclical  macroeconomic 
management, while increased openness exposes generous welfare states to trade competition 
and permits capital to move to the lowest-cost producer countries. Finally, there is the danger 
that tax competition will result in the under-provision of public goods. 
Second, from within, ageing populations, declining birth rates, changing gender roles in 
households as a result of the mass entry of women to the labor market, the shift from an 
industrial to the service economy, new technologies in the organization of work, engender 
sub-optimal employment levels, new inequalities and human capital-biased patterns of social 
exclusion.  Skills-biased  technological  change,  the  feminization  of  the  labor  market,  and 
demographic ageing, as a result of rising life expectancy and rapidly falling birth rates, are 
the  most  important  drivers  of  the  new  post-industrial  risk  profile.  While  the  boundaries 
between being ‘in’ and ‘out’ of work have been blurred by increases in atypical work, low-
wages, subsidized jobs, and training programs, one job is no longer enough to keep low-
income families out of poverty. According to Gøsta Esping-Andersen et al (2002), the most 
important reason why the existing systems of social care have become overstretched stems 
from  the  weakening  of  labor  markets  and  family  households  as  traditional  providers  of 
welfare. In addition, new sources of immigration and segregation, especially in the housing 
market  in  metropolitan  areas,  pose  a  challenge  to  social  cohesion.  The  present  economic 
crisis is likely to pose new forms of segmentation on the labor markets to the detriment of the 
most vulnerable groups such as agency workers, fixed-term employees and the unemployed 
while  labor  market  insiders  have  less  to  fear.  Hence,  risks  and  capacities  to  adapt  are 
distributed unequally across the labor force.  
And  while  policy  makers  must  find  new  ways  to  manage  the  adverse  consequences  of 
economic internationalization and post-industrial differentiation, their endeavor to recast the 
welfare state is severely constrained by long standing social policy commitments in the areas 
of  unemployment  and  pensions,  which  have  ushered  in  a  period  of permanent  austerity 
(Pierson 1998, 2001A). The maturation of welfare commitments, policies put in place to cater 
after the social risks associated with the post-war industrial era now seem to crowd out and 
overload the available policy space for effective policy responses in especially public services 
under conditions of low economic growth. This specter of permanent austerity is likely to 
intensify  in  the  face  of  population  ageing.  Although  in  the  current  downturn  many 
governments switch to public spending in order to reflate the economy, this may generate 
additional fiscal pressures in the foreseeable future. 
Finally, as an intervening variable in the process, issues of work and welfare have become 
ever more intertwined with processes of European political and economic integration since 
the 1980s. It is fair to say that in the EU we have entered an era of semi-sovereign welfare 
states  (Leibfried  and  Pierson  2000).  European  economic  integration  has  fundamentally   4
recast the boundaries of national systems of employment regulation and social protection, 
both by constraining autonomy for domestic policy options but also by opening opportunities 
for EU-led social and employment coordination and agenda setting (Ferrera 2005; Zeitlin 
2005).  The  introduction  of  the  internal  market  and  the  introduction  of  the  EMU,  and 
Stability and Growth Pact, have added a new economic supranational layer to domestic social 
and economic policy repertoires of individual Member States. Since the mid-1990s, the EU 
has taken on a far more pro-active role as a central social policy agenda setter. The European 
Employment  Strategy,  based  on  the  new  Employment  Title  of  the  Amsterdam  Treaty, 
launched in 1997, is exemplary of the EU’s new role of agenda setting policy coordination, 
designed to catalyze rather than steer domestic social policy reform.  
Although all European welfare states face the challenges of economic internationalization, 
post-industrial  societal  change,  and  intensified  European  integration  under  conditions  of 
relative macroeconomic austerity, comparative research reveals how internal and external 
challenges  confront  different  clusters  of  welfare  regimes  with  a  distinct  constellation  of 
adjustment problems and reform agendas. It  has often been argued that the institutional 
configuration of Continental welfare states, with their traditional Bismarckian labor market 
and  social  policy  legacies,  with  its  strong  bias  towards  the  protection  of  the  steady 
employment of male breadwinners, are, in comparison to the Anglo-Saxon social model and 
the Scandinavians worlds of welfare, the most difficult to reform. In spite of the obvious 
‘irresistible  forces’  urging  for  reform,  the  Continental  welfare  model  has  remained  an 
‘unmovable  object’  (Pierson  1998).  Especially  the  larger  political  economies  of  France, 
Germany and Italy, are often mocked for their ‘frozen fordism’, ‘inactivity traps’, ‘welfare 
without  work’  conundrum  and  ‘insider-outsider’  segmentation,  ‘perverse  familialism’  and 
‘permanent  pension  crises’  (Palier  and  Martin  2007).  With  the  Bismarckian  regime  type 
covering a large majority of EU Member States, this is all the more problematic for the EU 
aspiring to become – following the Lisbon agenda – the most competitive knowledge-based 
economy in the world.  
As  the  series  of  fresh  and  detailed  analyses  of  reforms  implemented  in  Bismarckian 
welfare systems published in this volume show,  the pace and scope of Continental welfare 
reform is more profound, even if incomplete, than is suggested in the literature on the ‘new 
politics of the welfare state’. To be sure, the Continental reform momentum is very rooted in 
the incongruence between new economic and social contexts and institutional resilience of 
Bismarckian  male-breadwinner  social  policy  provisions,  based  on  occupationally  distinct, 
employment-related  social  insurance  principles,  underpinned  by  traditional  (single-
breadwinner)  family  values  (Esping-Andersen  1990;  Ferrera  1998;  Scharpf  and  Schmidt 
2000;  Ferrera,  Hemerijck  and  Rhodes  2000;  Palier  2006).  Catching  up  with  the  more 
employment  and  family-friendly  Scandinavian  and  Anglo-Saxon  welfare  state  has  been   5
particularly difficult for Continental welfare states, as will be surveyed below. The slow but 
fundamental departure from ‘welfare without work’ strategy in Continental welfare systems 
since the mid-1990s is best understood as a profound transformative process of policy change 
across a number of intimately related policy domains. However, the reform sequence that led 
to ever more fundamental transformations of the Bismarckian edifice began even earlier in 
the 1970s with a first wave of retrenchment  that  eventually paved the way for  more far-
reaching  institutional  and  later  structural  reforms.  Through  a  more  or  less  protracted 
sequence of reforms, Bismarckian welfare states shifted from labor shedding to policies that 
aim  at  mobilizing  labor  supply  as  well  as  labor  demand.  Employment  friendly  policies 
replaced  mainly  social  policy  approaches  to  unemployment.  By  deliberately  begging  the 
question of Continental welfare inertia, this contribution focuses on the adaptive capacity of 
Europe’s Bismarckian welfare states to the challenges of economic internationalization and 
post-industrial  differentiation,  and  permanent  austerity  in  the  shadow  of  intensified 
European (economic) integration.  
The  argument  is  constructed  as  follows.  First,  Section  2  renders  an  inventory  of 
comparative employment so as to highlight the particular weaknesses of the Bismarck-type 
welfare  regime,  together  with  its  recent  improvements,  in  comparison  to  other  European 
welfare state families. Next, section 3 turns a diachronic qualitative analysis of the sequence 
and  scope  of  employment-friendly  reforms  in  different  policy  areas  within  and  across 
different Bismarckian welfare systems. This overview will reveal how much the 1990s and 
early 2000s has been an epoch of intense policy change in the make up Europe’s Bismarckian 
welfare states. To say that the Continental welfare state is far from sclerotic is not to say that 
they  are  in  good  shape.  In  conclusion,  Section  4  highlights,  by  employing  a  life  course 
perspective,  what  we  think  is  the  unfinished  social  reform  agenda  for  most  Continental 
welfare states still today. 
 
X.2 The continental employment dilemma  
 
Employment is the most important measure for judging the sustainability of the Continental 
welfare state and the success of social and economic policy reform. The reason for this is 
simple:  benefits  and  social  services  have  to  be  paid  by  the  taxes  and  social  security 
contributions  from  those  in  work.  The  more  working  people  there  are,  the  broader  this 
funding  base  is.  In  the  event  of  long-term  unemployment,  incapacity  to  work  and  early 
retirement, spending on social security goes up while at the same time revenues fall. From a 
sociological  perspective,  having  a  job  also  benefits  people  by  giving  them  enhanced 
opportunities for self-actualization and self-esteem. Participating in the labor market is today   6
the most important form of social interaction and, as such, is an indispensable element in 
achieving social cohesion. 
The  response  of  the  Continental  and  Mediterranean  welfare  states  to  the  process  of 
economic restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s, but also the policy applied by the transition 
countries in the early 1990s was aimed at keeping open unemployment low by limiting labor 
supply. Most Continental welfare states began using disability pensions, early retirement, 
and long-term unemployment schemes to remove older and less productive workers from the 
labor  market.  Luring  people  out  of  the  labor  market  by  facilitating  early  retirement, 
increasing  benefits  for  the  long-term  unemployed,  lifting  the  obligation  of  job  search  for 
older workers, discouraging mothers from job search, favoring long periods of leave, easing 
the  access  to  disability  pensions  and  reducing  working  hours,  all  contributed  to  the 
characteristically Continental ‘welfare without work’ policy strategy that became popular in 
the 1980s and for most of the 1990s (Esping-Andersen, 1996). Growing demands on social 
security led to burgeoning costs to be borne by the labor market. From the middle of the 
1980s  onwards,  employers  in  Continental  welfare  states  increasingly  began  using  labor-
saving  technology  and  shedding less productive employees via the  social security  system. 
This turned the Continental productivity squeeze into an inactivity trap. A vicious cycle arose 
of high gross wage costs, low net wages, the exit of less productive workers and rising social 
costs,  creating  a  spiral  of  falling  employment  and  rising  economic  inactivity.  This  also 
undermined the financial basis of the social security system. In addition, strict employment 
regulation,  including  minimum  wages  and  hiring  and  firing  restrictions,  protected  the 
insiders in key industries, while harming the participation of outsiders, youngsters, women, 
older  workers,  low  skill  groups  and  ethnic  minorities  (Hemerijck,  van  Kersbergen,  and 
Manow 2000). 
From the 1990s onwards the policy of labor supply reduction came to be brandished as a 
policy failure and, if continued uncorrected, as a threat to the survival of the welfare state. 
Towards  the  mid-1990s,  the  Continental  or  Bismarckian  employment  deficit  triggered  an 
important shift in the definition of the crisis of the Continental welfare state away from early 
exit adjustment strategies. Policy makers came to realize that the low level of labor market 
participation was the Achilles’ heel of the Continental welfare state. This diagnosis initiated a 
series of reforms intended to overcome male-breadwinner policy provisions and to correct for 
past early exit policy mistakes in many areas of social and economic regulation, including 
collective bargaining, social security, labor market policy and regulation, pensions and social 
services, including health and education. To be sure, at times these reforms met with stiff 
resistance from the social partners, especially the trade unions, defending their privileged 
position in Bismarckian social insurance administration with its tradition of associational   7
self-regulation by the social partners, as a corollary of the payroll financing of the Continental 
welfare state.  
In part as a result of these reforms, since the mid-1990s, there has been a significant 
increase  in  employment  across  virtually  all  mature  European  welfare  states  over  the  last 
decade  (Eichhorst  and  Hemerijck  2008).  Figure  X.1  shows  the  employment/population 
ratios among people in the working age population. What is striking is, first, the long-term 
increase in employment in most countries and, second, some persistent differences in the 
overall share of people in gainful employment across countries and families of welfare states. 
We can see substantial gains over the last decade, in particular in traditional low and medium 
employment countries. Except for three transition countries, all Bismarckian welfare states 
experienced  job  growth.  It  was  most  pronounced  in  the  Netherlands  and  Spain,  but  also 
Austria, F rance,  Belgium,  Italy  and H ungary  saw  notable  increases  in  the 
employment/population ratio so that employment rates across Europe converged to a certain 
extent. The Bismarckian cluster can no longer be described as a group of countries with a low 
employment level. In fact, Switzerland and the Netherlands join Sweden and Denmark as the 
group with the highest employment rates whereas Austria, the Czech Republic and Germany 
are above the EU-27 average and France, Belgium, Italy and Hungary approached this value 
considerably.   
 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Eurostat  
 
Figure X.2 shows the long-term development of employment rates for selected European 
countries  and  the  US.  Unfortunately,  there a re  no  similar  long-term  series f or  the  new 
member states. The convergence over time within the EU is striking. Now, both the Anglo-  8
Saxon and the Scandinavian countries as well as Switzerland have about 75 to 80 per cent of 
the  working-age  population  in  employment.  The  same  level  is  also  achieved  by  the 
Netherlands after an impressive increase in employment over the last two decades whereas 
Austria  almost  reaches  the  UK  employment  level.  The  other  Continental  and  Southern 
European countries are still somewhat behind with employment rates between 60 and 70 per 
cent. But we can see some long-term progress, in particular in Spain, Italy and Belgium while 
France and Germany have caught up more recently. It seems fair to say that the Bismarckian 
countries are now closer to the other clusters in terms of employment and have successfully 
overcome a low employment / low participation equilibrium. 
Mirroring  the  improvement  in  employment  performance,  standardized  unemployment 
rates  declined  in  most  European  countries  over  the  last  decade  as  figure  X.2  shows. 
Unemployment continued to decline in terms of annual data in 2008, but due to the current 
crisis  the  most  recent  months  saw  some  increase  in  unemployment  again.  However,  the 
employment performance is still much better than some years ago. What is most remarkable 
is  the  strong  decline  in  unemployment  in  some  Southern  and  Continental  European 
countries such as Spain, France and Italy while Slovakia and Poland still suffer the highest 
unemployment rates in the EU. The Netherlands, Switzerland, and even Austria continue to 
have v ery l ow l evels o f u nemployment.  In c ontrast  to t he 1 970s a nd 1 980s,  however, 
decreases of open unemployment are no longer associated with declines of employment and 
inflows  into  inactivity  but  mirror  positive  employment  dynamics.  Nevertheless,  open 
unemployment is still the highest in some Bismarckian countries such as Slovakia, Poland, 
Germany, Spain and France.  
 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Eurostat   9
 
It  was  not  until  the  second  half  of  the  1990s  that  there  was  a  limited  increase  in  the 
employment rate in the Mediterranean welfare states, which, in fact, have seen some of the 
biggest employment gains in the EU over the last decade. The Netherlands occupies a special 
place comparatively because it was the first Continental welfare state with a historically low 
female employment rate to improve its performance, trending towards Scandinavian levels. 
In the age group aged 25-54 years (prime age), a strong convergence can be observed since 
the middle of the 1990s (figure X.3). Over the last decade we can observe substantial recovery 
in  the  Scandinavian  countries  after  the  crisis  in  the  early  1990s,  but  also  considerable 
improvement  in  the  Continental  and  Southern  European  countries,  in  particular  in  the 
Dutch, Spanish and Italian cases. 
 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































There is much more regime-specific variation regarding the employment rates of older 
workers, women and the low-skilled. Differences in the extent to which these three groups 
are  integrated  into  the  labor  market  basically  determine  differences  in  the  overall 
employment  rate.  With  respect  to  the  55-64 a ge  cohort  (see f igure  X.4),  one  can  clearly 
identify some legacy of early retirement policies in Continental and Southern welfare states, 
but also in the transition countries. The Continental and Mediterranean welfare states and 
most of the new EU member states saw a dramatic fall of more than 30 per cent in the 
employment rate of older workers from the 1980s due to early retirement, particularly among 
men.  Since  the  end  of  the  1990s,  the  employment  rate  among  older  workers  has  been   10
increasing  strongly  in  Finland,  but  also  in  some  Continental  welfare  states,  with  the 
Netherlands taking the lead. Switzerland, which did not use early retirement massively, is 
close to Sweden in this dimension. Other Bismarckian countries are reversing historically low 
employment levels of older workers. Germany and the Netherlands are now above the 50 per 
cent EU target employment rate for older workers while the Czech Republic and Spain are 
approaching this value. Austria, France, the Slovak Republic, Belgium, Italy and Hungary 
have also improved while Poland is lagging behind with less than 30 per cent.  
 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Looking at gender, we see some cross-country convergence in the employment rate of men 
between  70  and  80  per  cent  with  Switzerland  and  the  Netherlands  at  the  top.  Male 
employment grew slightly in most EU countries. Again, there is a structural  gap in male 
employment in three of the Visegrad countries and the western Bismarckian countries which 
relied most on early retirement (Belgium, France and Italy).   11
 
 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































The labor market entry of women is the most striking recent development in European 
welfare states (see figure X.6). In the early 1970s, the Netherlands had the lowest female 
employment rate in the OECD, at 29 per cent. This was lower than the figures in Ireland, 
Greece,  Spain,  and  Italy,  where  the  rates  were  just  above  30  per  cent.  Since  then  the 
employment rate of women has grown strongly across all EU Member States except for some 
of  the  transformation  countries.  From  1997  until  2007,  the  rate  in  the  Netherlands  has 
increased by more than 12 percentage points to almost 70 per cent and even stronger in 
Ireland  and  Spain,  but  Germany,  France,  Belgium  and  other  Bismarckian  countries  also 
experienced increases between five and nine percentage points so that female employment 
rates in Austria and Germany are also around 64 per cent nowadays while France reaches 60 
per cent. The female employment rate in the Netherlands is currently still lower than in the 
Scandinavian  welfare  states  and  Switzerland,  but  here  as  elsewhere  younger  cohorts  are 
undergoing a notable convergence in the direction of stronger labor force participation. For 
younger cohorts, female employment in Southern and Continental Europe is rapidly catching 
up to Northern European averages.   12
 
 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In the Continental welfare states, the ability to work part-time has created an important 
means of entry to the labor market for women, in particular in the Netherlands. In countries 
with a long-standing tradition of female employment, such as the Scandinavian countries, 
part-time employment is less common. This means that the significant increases in female 
employment  counted  per  heads  is r elated  to  persistent,  but  decreasing  gaps  in  full-time 
equivalent employment between the sexes as figure X.7 shows. This gap is smaller than 10 or 
15 percentage points in the Scandinavian countries and some of the new EU Member States 
while the difference between men and women in terms of full-time equivalents is larger than 
20 percentage points in Belgium, Germany and Austria and between 27 and 29 percentage 
points in Spain, Italy and the Netherlands.    13
 
 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































Employment rates by skill levels differ mostly for the labor force with less than upper 
secondary schooling or vocational training, less so for the high skilled. Figure X.8 shows 
marked differences in low skill employment across countries and families of welfare states. 
The  Netherlands,  Switzerland  and  –  notably  –  Spain  are  among  the  countries  with  the 
highest low-skilled employment rate. Particular deficits are found in the New Member States, 
but  also  in  some  Continental  European  countries  such  as  France,  Italy,  Germany  and 
Belgium where only about half of the low-skilled or even less are integrated into the labor 
market.  Given  the  strong  pressures  of  technological  progress  and  globalization  it  is 
interesting to see that there is no general decline in the employment rates of the low skilled.   14
 
 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Summarizing the overview on employment performance, we can see, first and foremost, a 
significant  improvement  in  employment  performance  and  a  significant  decline  in 
unemployment across most Bismarckian welfare systems over the last ten years. However, in 
terms  of  labor  market  performance,  the  Bismarckian  countries  do  not  form  a  consistent 
cluster. While Switzerland has always had a good labor market record and is now joined by 
the  Netherlands,  the  other  Continental  European  countries  as  well  as  the  Mediterranean 
welfare state caught up significantly although there is still some gap in comparison to the 
Scandinavian  and  the  Anglo-Saxon  countries  with  respect  to  most  of  the  labor  market 
parameters.  
 
X.3 A sequence of intense reforms  
 
As this book shows, Bismarckian welfare states are not what they used to be – and they are 
now in a fundamentally different shape than in the late 1990s when they were described as 
‘frozen landscapes’. The Bismarckian countries have undergone a sequence of institutional 
change that started in the 1970s which led to more institutional and structural changes in the 
following decades. Hence, the overall improvement in employment performance is related to 
groundbreaking  social  policy  changes  which  were  enacted  in  the  majority  of  European   15
welfare states. Since the late 1970s, consecutive changes in the world economy, European 
politics (most spectacularly the demise of communism in Eastern Europe), labor markets, 
and  family  structures,  have  disturbed  the  once  sovereign  and  stable  social  and  economic 
policy repertoires. As a consequence, all developed welfare states of the European Union have 
been recasting the basic policy mix upon which their national systems of social protection 
were  built  after  1945.  Below  we  render  a  stylized  sketch  of  the  reform  agendas  across 
Bismarckian welfare states since the 1970s by policy area and country cluster. If we interpret 
the welfare state more broadly than social protection narrowly understood, it is possible to 
paint a broad, cumulatively transformative process of policy change across most the majority 
of Continental welfare states in a number of intimately related policy areas (Eichhorst and 
Hemerijck 2008).  
With some stylization of national reform trajectories, we can identify four basic stages of 
welfare state and labor market reform in Bismarckian countries (see the introductory chapter 
by Palier):  
1.  the  phase  before  retrenchment  from  the  mid-1970s  onwards  until  the  late 
1980s, 
2.  a first wave of retrenchment in the early 1990s, 
3.  more far-reaching institutional reforms in the second half of the nineties,  
4.  a second wave of more path-breaking changes in the 2000s.  
Of course, not all national reform trajectories fit perfectly in the four phases, but overall the 
broad transformation of Bismarckian welfare states can be analyzed in terms of a stepwise and 
increasingly fundamental, i.e. progressive modification of established social and labor market 
policies.  
 
The first phase: the good, old recipe of labor shedding  
 
The first stage of transforming Bismarckian welfare states set in with the economic shocks of 
the mid-1970s. The macro-economic downturn in the aftermath of the steep increase in oil 
prices  pushed  unemployment  to  levels  unknown  in  the  after-war  period  in  most  European 
countries. To counter what was first perceived as a cyclical crisis most Bismarckian welfare 
states used unemployment benefits as an automatic stabilizer and implemented some Keynesian 
policies basically by allowing the public and the social budget to run into deficits. As part of the 
social  approach  to  unemployment  and  to  support  the  victims  of  the  economic  crisis  most 
Bismarckian countries opened up exit routes from the labor market, actually in particular for 
workers made redundant in manufacturing which was most severely hit by adverse economic 
conditions. In the labor market, in the 1970s, most Bismarckian welfare states started using 
the social security system to remove older and less productive workers from the labor market,   16
through disability pensions, early retirement, and long-term unemployment schemes. Core 
groups of the Bismarckian welfare state and employment model, i.e. male breadwinners in 
standard employment relationships, got privileged access to more generous benefits which 
were seen as a short-time stabilization tool in order to prevent losses in human capital first 
but eventually turned into pathways to long-term inactivity. Though producing short-term 
gains,  and  backed  by  unions  as  a  solution  to  unemployment  among  young  people,  this 
strategy  would  eventually  entail  considerable  costs  in  terms  of  job  creation  and  fiscal 
pressure on the welfare state. Generous early retirement or disability benefits, but also heavy 
reliance on regular unemployment benefits and active labor market policy schemes, in turn, had 
medium-run  consequences  in  terms  of  higher  social  insurance  contributions  rates  for  both 
employers  and  employees.  But  at  that  point  in  time  policy  makers  preferred  increasing 
contribution  rates  to  cutting  social  insurance  benefits  although  there  were  some  marginal 
attempts at budgetary consolidation such as the introduction of higher user fees in health care 
and  smaller  changes  in  unemployment  benefits.  Most  notably,  however,  in  particular  the 
Southern  countries  Spain  (Guillén,  this  volume)  and  Italy  (Jessoula  and  Alti,  this  volume) 
implemented some consolidation programs in pension and disability already in the 1980s ahead 
of other Bismarckian countries.  
Overall, the welfare state arrangement itself was hardly changed in the mature Bismarckian 
systems where there was tendency to apply ‘good old recipes.’ Regarding employment, this was 
later seen as the root cause of the Bismarckian ‘welfare without work’ syndrome associated with 
high  non-wage  labor  costs  and  a  heavy  reliance  on  non-employment  benefits.  In  terms  of 
welfare state change, initial responses to the crisis of the seventies can be seen as a routine 
relying  on  existing  benefit  schemes  and  labor  market  policies.  Labor  shedding  indicated  a 
regime consistent reaction to the economic shocks of the 1970s. The policy response came 
from  within  the  Bismarckian  regime.  Outside  alternatives,  following  the  Scandinavian 
activation  or  Anglosaxon  retrenchment,  were  not  yet  taken  seriously.  Labour  supply 
reduction  was  seen  as  the  only  way  to  cope  with  rising  unemployment.  The  regime  was 
unchanged. To revive the Bismarckian regime, adherence to labor supply reduction made 
sense to the relevant policy actors.  
While the mature welfare states of that period have later been described as a ‘frozen’ welfare 
states  landscape,  there  were  some  notable  institutional  changes  –  not  only  with  respect  to 
increasing  the  generosity  of  existing  benefits  but  also  in  terms  of  some  steps  to  reinforce 
minimum income protection. This can be illustrated by the Belgian minimum income policies 
(see Hemerijck and Marx, this volume), but also by the introduction of the French RMI in 1988 
(see Palier’s chapter on France, this volume) and the more universal access to health care (see 
Italy,  Spain  and  France)  as  well  as  to  family  benefits  and  the  creation  of  mandatory 
unemployment insurance in Switzerland as late as in 1984 (Häusermann, this volume). These   17
reforms were the first, albeit partial steps to establish a general minimum support framework 
which had been absent in Bismarckian welfare states thus far. Hence, in many Bismarckian 
countries,  the phase of defensive  adjustment  via  passive  social  policies  was  also  a phase of 
expansion of more universal social policy coverage – in particular in those countries with less 
mature policy arrangements and in those areas and for those target groups typically neglected in 
a Bismarckian setting. This was often associated with a purification of social insurance in terms 
of  a  more  direct  link  between  contributions  and  benefits  and  a  removal  of  redistributional 
elements in social insurance. This gradual shift towards tax-funded social policies gained in 
importance over the years to come.  
While  employment  security  for  labor  market  insiders  remained  unchanged,  most 
Bismarckian countries started liberalizing the use of more flexible jobs in the 1980s in order to 
allow for some additional job creation without endangering the core of the labor market. Fixed-
term  jobs,  but  also  part-time  employment  became  an  increasingly  prominent  secondary 
segment in otherwise rather rigid labor markets (see the Spanish, the French or the Dutch 
experience). The Netherlands, however, were the first to adopt a more strategic approach to 
welfare  state  restructuring  and  employment  creation  with  the  renewal  of  corporatist 
negotiations in the shadow of hierarchy. In fact, the Netherlands combined wage restraint, cuts 
in  social  benefits  and  first  steps  towards  activation  with  an  expansion  of  flexible  jobs,  in 
particular part-time work while tolerating access to disability benefits as the Dutch exit route 
from the labor market (Hemerijck and Marx, this volume).  
The  passive  labor  shedding  approach  to  unemployment  led  to  a  situation  of  low 
employment and increasing non-wage labor costs in Bismarckian welfare states.  
  
Second phase: Cost containment and retrenchment  
 
A first wave of more stringent retrenchment began in the 1990s in order to stabilize public 
budgets,  limit  public  debts  and  improve  international  competitiveness  in  a  situation  of 
accelerated international and European integration. However, it was only as a result of the 
constraints imposed by the Maastricht criteria that, in most Bismarckian countries, a change 
occurred  in  the  policies  implemented:  instead  of  increasing  social  contributions, 
governments started to try to reduce the level of social benefits. In this new context, social 
spending was not seen as an economic investment any more, nor as a support of economic 
growth, but as a cost to be better  controlled.  The welfare state was  not seen as a purely 
beneficial  arrangement  to  help  the  victims  of  economic  restructuring  anymore,  but  was 
increasingly  perceived  as  a  potential  source  of  problems  and  disincentives.  Hence,  cost 
containment became a more important policy objective compared to the 1970s and 1980s. To 
consolidate the social policy budget, most Bismarckian countries increased the contributive   18
character of social insurance benefits while giving a larger role to tax-funding of welfare state 
provisions, in particular non-contributory benefits, i.e. universal and means-tested assistance 
schemes, but also cross-subsidizing social insurance. The stronger differentiation between 
insurance and assistance also meant a clearer dualization of welfare state programs. At the 
same time, however, stronger minimum income elements addressed new social risks such as 
poverty and exclusion that resulted from insufficient access to insurance benefits. Slowly but 
surely mature Bismarckian welfare systems started to converge on the mixed Dutch welfare 
system, combining Beveridgean social assistance and minimum state pensions  with more 
traditional vestiges of Bismarckian social insurance for core workers.  
The  attempt  to  re-establish  the  Bismarckian  regime  through  labor  supply  reduction 
created tensions within the regime when long term inactivity turned out to be permanent. 
Not only were the labor shedding strategies ineffective in mitigating the economic economic 
downturn; they almost killed the Bismarckian welfare state patient. The burden of labour 
shedding became too great to bear in the context of the mid-1990s. The Continental model 
was saved, but the conditions that had sustained it before onslaught of the 1980s recession no 
longer existed. The persistent ‘welfare without work’ syndrome generated a complex reform 
agenda  aimed  at  rationalizing  spending  by  curtailing  pension  commitments  and  ‘passive’ 
benefits,  improving  family  policy,  introducing  ‘active’  incentives  into  short-term  cash 
benefits, reforming labor markets to overcome insider/outsider cleavages, and reducing the 
incidence of social charges. These systems, though, are especially ‘veto-heavy’ and any reform 
must be negotiated with or around entrenched vested interests. The spur to reform in this 
group was the deep recession of European economies in the early 1990s, which produced a 
sharp rise in unemployment and ballooning public debt. From the early 1990s on, a new 
consensus on employment promotion spread across these countries, though the extent of 
reform and success in promoting new employment creation has varied.  
But at the same time many Bismarckian countries continued with early retirement and 
disability schemes as major schemes to reduce labor supply (see the Austrian experience, 
Obinger and Tálos, this volume) whereas others tackled the issue of inactivity by restricting 
access  to  non-employment  benefits  (see  the  Dutch  reform  sequence  regarding  disability 
benefits). In the Netherlands, from 1994 onwards, the government, committed to a ‘jobs, 
jobs, and more jobs’ strategy, sought greater efficiencies in social security, including partial 
re-privatization  of  social  risks,  managed  liberalization  of  administration,  reducing  social 
partner involvement, and introduced and intensified activation obligations for the long-term 
unemployed.  
Some countries such as Italy were the first to start building a second pillar in pensions 
while consolidating the public first pillar pension regime (Amato and Dini reforms). Parallel 
to this, Bismarckian countries such as France or Switzerland streamlined the unemployment   19
benefit system, further ‘purified’ the insurance schemes while strengthening assistance and 
minimum  income  protection.  Activation  policies  were  expanded  and  started  to  limit  the 
realm of unconditional receipt of unemployment benefits more effectively. The tax share in 
social policy was increase to stabilize or reduce the burden of non-wage labor costs (see the 
CSG in France). In contrast to more ambitious reform sequences, post-unification Germany 
expanded its established repertoire of rising social insurance contributions to fund heavy 
spending on passive non-employment benefits and labor market policies to accommodate the 
job losses in Eastern Germany in a ‘smooth’ and ‘social’ way (Hinrichs, this volume). This, 
however, resulted in stronger concerns regarding the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state 
and international competitiveness.  
In terms of the political economy, the 1990s saw a major revival of negotiated welfare state 
reform via social pacts (see the Netherlands, Austria, but also Spain and Italy) and stronger 
state intervention e.g. by introducing a parliamentary vote on the social budget (France). 
Reform  capacities  of  Bismarckian  welfare  states  were  improved  by  a  wave  of  successful 
tripartite agreements and a stronger role of governments. Social partnership also contributed 
to  reforms  narrowing  the  divide  in  labor  market  regulation  and  job  protection  between 
permanent and temporary employees after a period of strong growth in the flexible segment 
of the labor market (see in particular the reform sequence in Spain in the mid-nineties).    
 
Third phase:Mobilizing the labor force  
 
The  reforms  of  the  early  nineties  paved  the  way  for  institutional  change  beyond 
retrenchment.  In  an  increasingly  globalized  and  Europeanized  economic  context,  welfare 
systems were partly seen as a cause for crisis in terms of social exclusion brought about by 
work disincentives and higher unemployment driven by structural weaknesses such as rigid 
labor  market  regulation  and  a  heavy  burden  of  taxes,  and  even  worse,  social  insurance 
contributions. Corporatist settings were seen as somewhat detrimental to more far-reaching 
labor  market  and  welfare  state  reforms.  Building  upon  earlier  reforms,  new  universal  or 
targeted benefits beyond Bismarckian social insurance became increasingly important. The 
same held for the share of taxes in welfare  state funding and state-driven governance as 
opposed to administration by the social partners. This was also associated with new modes of 
governance  including  a  more  prominent  role  of  private  providers  of  public/private 
partnership. This broader process of ‘defrosting’ spread across Bismarckian welfare states. 
It is not an easy task to change policy direction, as policy actor are locked into the short 
term bargains of dominant policy legacies.  in the short run. They needed to be convinced, 
often by dramatic and highly visible events,  that the regime had to change. Central to the 
‘defrosting’ of the Bismarckian welfare system was a change in the problem definition of the   20
crisis of the Bismarckian welfare state in the late 1990s, away from fighting unemployment 
through  early  exit.  Instead,  the  Scandinavian  preoccupation  with  maximizing  the  rate  of 
labour force participation became the number one priority. The commitment to high levels of 
employment, ‘jobs, jobs, and more jobs’, became to core social and economic policy objective 
of the Dutch governments led by Wim Kok in the 1990s.   
 
  
Regarding activation, Germany, in contrast to early stages of the reform trajectory, shifted 
from a passive to a more active social policy by phasing out early retirement and increasing 
the  individual’s  burden  of  proof  with  respect  to  suitable  job  offers,  withdrawing  human 
capital safeguard provisions as well as stabilizing non-wage labor costs by way of higher tax 
funding,  e.g.  green  taxes.  In  many  Bismarckian  countries,  earlier  reforms  towards  the 
activation  of  benefit  recipients  and  the  liberalization  of  flexible  jobs  continued,  but  also 
triggered some more restrictive counter action (see France or Germany). To foster efficiency 
in  labor  market  policies,  public  employment  service  monopolies  were  removed  (e.g.  in 
Germany  or  Italy)  to  allow  for  private  agencies  to  enter  this  market.  In  reaction  to  the 
purification of contributory social insurance and the limitations to social insurance coverage, 
countries  such  as  France  strengthened  minimal  social  guarantees  by  creating  non-
contributory  means-tested  benefits  for  income  (RMI)  and  health  (CMU)  protection.  The 
Netherlands probably pursued the most ambitious strategy to raise labor force participation 
in a low unemployment situation. This involved tackling the disability issue by tightening 
access  to  benefits,  as  well  as  using  new  modes  of  governance.  In  order  to  activate  social 
assistance claimants a contractual approach and stronger municipal responsibility in terms of 
measures and resources was implemented. Performance-oriented management was also a 
core  element  of  Swiss  activation  policies  implemented  after  1995.  In  the  late  1990s,  the 
Netherlands  also  managed  to  negotiate  better  employment  protection  for  flexible  jobs  in 
exchange for some changes in dismissal protection for employees on permanent contracts 
(flexicurity legislation). 
 
Fourth phase: More fundamental transformation  
 
Given the increasingly intensive reform dynamics spreading across countries and policy 
areas, the fourth phase of reforms in the 2000s can be described as path-breaking change. By 
layering,  i.e.  adding  non-traditional  and  non-Bismarckian  elements  to  established 
arrangements of social and labor market policies, the overall character of the institutional 
edifice  was  modified  and  eventually  allowed  for  more  transformative  reforms.  Given 
European  and  global  economic  integration  as  well  as  the  relevance  of  new  social  risks,   21
Bismarckian  countries  changed  their  basic  institutional  settings  and  are  fundamentally 
different  from  the  arrangements  found  in  the  1970s.  This  was  not  a  swift  and  coherent 
change but rather the result of long and more or less protracted sequences of partial reforms. 
At least in some crucial situations some of the Bismarckian countries could rely on negotiated 
and  more  strategic  institutional  reforms  while  others  mostly  started  reforming  on  the 
margins  of  the  labor  market  and  the  welfare  state  so  that  new  provisions  could  grow  in 
importance and pave the way for more far-reaching reforms affecting core elements.  
The  2000s  were  characterized  by  increasingly  generalized  activation  policies  and  the 
prominent role of employment incentives and employment-friendly benefits as stronger work 
incentives have become a major policy orientation since the late 1990s in countries which 
used to pursue a social approach to unemployment. As shown by Palier (2006), the growth of 
minimum income protection, but also second, private pillars in pension systems, however, 
implies  a  certain  dualization  of  social  protection  between  social  insurance  and  social 
assistance  programs  and  between  public  and  private  regimes.  Both  the  subsidization  of 
private  social  policies  and  the  growing  importance  of  means-tested  minimum  provisions 
bring about a higher share of tax-funding in Bismarckian welfare states. The Bismarckian 
regime entered a phase of more fundamental change.  
Reforms in the most recent phase were not heavily driven by the momentum of EMU but 
rather followed from earlier steps towards flexibility and activation. The major objective of 
social security now changed from passive compensation of social risks to setting individual 
behavioral  incentives  for  both  employers  and  benefit  claimants  to  achieve  labor  market 
integration:  out-of  work  benefits  were  complemented  by  in-work  benefits,  human  capital 
safeguard  clauses  in  activation  were  replaced  by  strict  suitability  criteria.  Activation  was 
dominated for some years at least by a work-first orientation, but more recently preventative 
social investment in human capital through early childhood education, schooling, training 
and lifelong learning moved up the public policy agenda (especilly in Spain, Switzerland or 
Germany).  However,  activation  policies  not  only  stressed  labor  market  (re)integration  of 
virtually  all  working-age  benefit  recipients  but  also  meant  a  generalization  of  minimum 
income support for the population (Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl 2008). Exit routes such as 
disability  and  early  retirement  are  being  closed  in  those  Bismarckian  countries  that  had 
continued those schemes over the 1990s (see the Netherlands or Austria), whereas Belgium 
has  been  more  reluctant  when  it  comes  to  curtailing  early  retirement  and  activating 
unemployment benefits.  
Activation is now a general objective implying intensified active labor market policy and 
new  modes  of  governance  such  as  target-oriented  management  of  public  agencies,  which 
have  become  more  autonomous  from  social  partner  influence  over  time,  and  contractual 
relationships between the state and the individual as well as between government and private   22
providers (see e.g. in the Netherlands, Switzerland or Austria). This, in fact, is associated with 
a  dual  social  protection  model,  combining  Bismarckian  social  insurance,  which  is  still  in 
place for core workers, with Beveridgean minimum income protection systems. Both Belgium 
and France also targeted stricter activation at recipients of minimum income support and 
implemented stronger in-work benefits for low-wage earners (e.g. the French ‘prime pour 
l’emploi’) or their employers via exemptions from social insurance contributions. With the 
2005 Hartz IV reform, Germany implemented a similar general assistance scheme for all 
working-age  inactives  who  were  capable  of  working  by  merging  former  unemployment 
assistance and social assistance. This was complemented with tight suitability criteria and 
sanctioning  provisions  so  that  strong  activation  requirements  concerned  all  long-term 
unemployed.  Germany  shifted  from  a  passive  welfare  state  accommodating  economic 
restructuring through long-term benefit receipt to one of the most ambitious and universal 
activation regimes. However, most countries aim at a more unified mode of governance and 
administrative  streamlining  of  benefit  payments,  activation  and  service  provision  for  all 
jobseekers,  in  particular  the  long-term  unemployed.  This  leads  to  new  cooperation 
arrangements  or  mergers  between  municipal  welfare  offices,  public  employment  services 
and/or unemployment insurance (see the German ARGE for long-term unemployed or the 
most  recent  French  ‘pôle  emploi’  bringing  together  unemployment  insurance  and  public 
labor market policies).  
Parallel to further benefit recalibration in public pension schemes and the introduction of 
minimum pension provisions, a new wave of pension reforms introduced or strengthened 
employer-based supplementary pensions and the fully-funded, private, but subsidized pillar 
of old-age pension, e.g. the Riester reform in Germany or PERP and PERCO in France. A 
similar  objective  lies  behind  the  new  severance  pay  funds  in  Austria  (‘Abfertigung  neu’). 
Finally,  the  growing  role  of  flexible  employment  paved  the  way  to  further  flexicurity 
legislation in highly regulated labor markets such as Spain while in other countries such as 
Germany  temporary  work  agencies,  self-employment,  and  also  part-time  jobs  provide  for 
alternative  flexibility  channels  so  that  dismissal  protection  is  less  under  pressure  than  a 
decade ago. The Visegrad countries, which had implemented passive social policies to cope 
with the transition crisis in the 1990s – similar to what the other Bismarckian countries had 
done in the 1970s and 1980s – embarked on the trend towards retrenchment, recalibration 
and activation in the current decade (Cerami, this volume).          
 
X.4 An unfinished social reform agenda for Bismarckian countries 
 
Neither the doomsday scenario of the demise of the Bismarckian welfare state, predicted by 
mainstream  economists  in  the  early  1990s,  nor  the  prevailing  image  of  a  ‘frozen  welfare   23
status quo’ can be corroborated by the welfare reform experience highlighted above. Over the 
past two decades, as the above inventory of reforms shows, many European welfare states 
have - with varying degrees of success - taken measures in order to redirect economic and 
social restructuring by pushing through adjustments in macro-economic policy, industrial 
relations, taxation, social security, labor market policy, employment protection legislation, 
pensions and social services, and welfare financing. The result has been a highly dynamic 
process of self-transformation of the Bismarckian welfare family (Hemerijck 2002), marked 
not  by  half-hearted  retrenchment  efforts  but  by  more  comprehensive  trajectories  of 
‘recalibration’,  ranging  from  redesigning  welfare  programs  to  the  elaboration  of  new 
principles of social justice (Ferrera, Hemerijck and Rhodes 2000; Ferrera and Hemerijck 
2003; Pierson 2001b). It is no exaggeration to say that Continental welfare states are in the 
midst  of  a  general  paradigmatic  shift  away  from  systems  geared  to  income  and  status 
maintenance  towards  more  universal,  but  activating  and  employment-friendly  as  well  as 
gender-neutral welfare systems. Many reforms were unpopular, but a fair amount occurred 
with  the  consent  of  opposition  parties,  trade  unions,  and  employer  organizations.  A  core 
feature,  however,  is  the  sequential  character  of  reforms.  More  far-reaching  institutional 
changes were facilitated by early reforms, initially often of minor character or at the margins 
of  the  labor  market  or  the  welfare  state,  but  later  to  be  generalized  as  a  consequence  of 
institutional layering (Palier, 2005, Bonoli, Palier, 2007).  
What stands out in the Bismarckian reform momentum of recent times is the redefinition 
of the employment problem away from managing unemployment toward the promotion of 
employment, on the basis of activation, active ageing/avoidance of early retirement, part-
time  work,  lifelong  learning,  parental  leave,  gender  mainstreaming,  flexicurity,  balancing 
flexibility with security, and reconciling work and family life. Moreover, Bismarckian welfare 
states are in the process of moving away from the breadwinner/caregiver model, under which 
mothers are expected to stay home with children, to a model of ‘employment for all’, under 
which  mothers  are  expected  to  enter  the  labor  force.  This  transition,  which  Ann  Orloff 
captures in terms of the ‘farewell to maternalism’, is not merely the product changing gender 
values (normative recalibration), it is also part of a more deliberate strategy of policy makers 
to attract mothers in the face of population ageing into the work force through activation 
programs,  tax  subsidies,  part-time  employment  regulation,  and  the  expansion  of  family 
services (Orloff 2006).  
The task of employment and social policy systems should, first and foremost, be to support 
the development of each person, with measures tailored to people’s capabilities and needs, 
and thus enabling them to reach their full potential. Many of the so-called ‘new social risks’, 
like family formation, divorce, the elderly becoming dependent on care, declining fertility, 
and  accelerating  population  ageing  bear  primarily  on  young  people  and  young  families,   24
signifying a shift in social risks from the elderly to the young. New risk bearers however lack 
critical social and political influence. Their ability to exert electoral and extra-parliamentary 
pressure  is  limited  by  the  fact  that,  for  most  people,  exposure  to  new  social  risks  is  a 
transitory phase of the family life course, concerned with child rearing, elder care, or labor 
markets  entry  and  exit  (Bonoli,  2005).  Since  family  and  gender  issues  have  remained 
subsidiary  in  the  reform  momentum  of  the  past  two  decades,  post-industrial  social  and 
economic change seems perversely to reinforce an over-accumulation of insurance benefits 
on  the  side  of  ‘guaranteed’  breadwinner  workers  with  quasi-tenured  jobs,  alongside 
inadequate  protection  for  those  employed  in  the  weaker  sectors  of  the  labor  market, 
particularly youngsters, women, immigrants and older low skilled workers. Late entry into 
the  labor  market  of  youngster,  early  exit  of  older  workers,  together  with  higher  life 
expectancy  confronts  the  welfare  state  with  a  looming  financing  deficit.  The  majority  of 
Europe’s mature Bismarckian welfare states are confronted with the distributive syndrome of 
labor market segmentation between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in terms of both dualized social 
protection  system  (insurance  vs.  assistance)  and  forms  of  employment,  i.e.  standard  vs. 
‘atypical’ jobs.  
 Welfare  reform  in  Bismarckian  systems  is,  as  we  have  exemplified  above,  extremely 
difficult,  but  surely  not  entirely  inconceivable.  Path-breaking  reforms,  such  as  the  Dutch 
reforms of the 1990s and Hartz reforms in Germany, brought policy reformers to expose the 
drawbacks of the widely popular welfare status quo, together with the old objectives, purpose 
and  principles  standing  social  policies  were  based  on.  By  framing  reform  resistance  as 
problematic,  policy  reformers  offended  entrenched  policy  stakeholders  and  organized 
interests  in  all  Bismarckian  states.  This  necessarily  implied  that  reform  oriented  policy 
makers have had to make consistent attempts to legitimize new policies and their underlying 
(new)  normative  principles.  Communicating  will  power  to  reform,  while  propagating  fair 
solutions,  has  proved  to  be  imperative  to  changing  prevailing  policy  repertoires.  In  the 
Bismarckian  institutional  context,  there  is  an  inherent  tension  here  between,  on  the  one 
hand, exposing stakeholders abuse of their vested interest positions, and, on the other hand, 
to appeal to stakeholders to rethink reform resistance in order to forge a more productive 
political and societal consensus. However, structural change in Bismarckian countries also 
means a recalibration of the relationship between government, employers and trade unions – 
some  of  the  most  important  reforms  were  implemented  by  the  social  partners  in  the 
government’s ‘shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1997) or brought about a structural weakening 
of social partnership in some countries, e.g. Germany or France, whereas in others such as 
the Netherlands, Switzerland or Austria, tripartite dialogue was revived and proved capable 
of adjusting to a new economic and societal environment. Moreover, strong and operative   25
social partnership seems to be associated with less severe dualization of labor markets and 
smoother adjustment.   
In  recent  years,  the  normative  focus  of  social  policy  hereby  shifts  from ex  post  social 
insurance  compensation  towards  preventive  or  ex  ante  employability,  hinging  on  the 
deployment of resources to improve and equalize citizens’ individual abilities to compete in 
the knowledge economy. In order to connect social policy more fully with a more dynamic 
economy and society, citizens have to be endowed with capabilities, through active policies 
that  intervene  early  in  the  life  cycle  rather  than  later  with  more  expensive  passive  and 
reactive policies (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002). At the heart of the new narrative lies a re-
orientation  in  social  citizenship,  away  from  freedom  from  want  towards  freedom  to  act, 
prioritizing high levels of employment for both men and women as the key policy objective, 
while combining elements of flexibility and security, under the proviso of accommodating 
work and family life and a guaranteed rich social minimum serving citizens to pursue fuller 
and  more  satisfying  lives  (Diamond  2006).  In  the  shadow  of  intensified  economic 
internationalization  and  post-industrial  societal  change,  a  relative  shift  from  the  social 
protection  function  of  the  welfare  state  to  more  of  an  emphasis  on  the  social  promotion 
function of the welfare state seems imperative. The differences in the allocation of public 
resources to either investment policies (such as education and training) or to compensating 
policies such as social benefits and passive and active labor market policies are most evident 
in figure X.10 which shows how public spending on education and social expenditure in per 
cent of GPD combined in 2005. While the overall association between both areas of public 
spending is positive in the Scandinavian ones, also some Bismarckian countries like Belgium 
and  France  now  combine  above-average  spending  on  social  policies  with  above-average 
spending on education. Germany and Italy, in contrast, spend a lot on social purposes but are 
relatively stingy on educational expenditure.    26
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Following  several  years  of  sound  economic  growth  and  strong  employment  expansion, 
European welfare states now face a dramatic economic downturn, for the first time since the 
launch of the Lisbon strategy in 2ooo. A major stress test for the Continental welfare state lies 
ahead. As the financial crisis deepens and spills over into rising unemployment and social 
duress,  the  need  for  resilient  employment  and  social  policy  is  greater  than  ever.  This 
precarious juncture creates a number of policy temptations. There is the obvious temptation 
of completely abandoning fiscal discipline to save jobs and maintain, as much as possible, the 
welfare status quo. Then there is the short sighted seduction of retrenching current welfare 
commitments  to  foster f inancial a nd  budgetary  stability.  Equally  ineffective  is  the  still 
alluring  strategy  to  fight  unemployment  through  reducing  labour  supply  through  early 
retirement, for which all Bismarckian welfare system fell in the 1980s and 1980s. Worse still 
is the nationalist and protectionist temptation that proved so disastrous in the 1930s. There 
is a real danger of adopting incoherent policy combinations that may actually deepen the 
economic  downturn,  worsening  job  losses,  reducing  state  revenue,  eroding  pensions,  and 
widening the gap between rich and poor. Historical mistakes, like deflationary contraction of 
the 1930s, and labour supply reduction of the 1980s and 1990s, should surely be avoided. In 
these uncertain times, we must not lose sight of the overall aim of creating employment-
friendly,  fair  and  efficient,  welfare  systems.  Short-  to  medium-term  macroeconomic 
measures  are  necessary  to  respond  to  immediate  needs,  but  such  measures  should  be   27
consistent with the ongoing recalibration efforts to prepare domestic welfare state and EU 
social policy for the challenges of the 21st century. There are seven policy priorities at stake:  
 
Let automatic stabilizers work 
So as to prevent a global economic abyss, it is necessary to let automatic stabilizers work, to 
protect citizens from the harshest effects of rising unemployment, while at the same time 
serving to safeguard economic demand. In the longer run, confidence in the economy relies 
on sound public finances. Today we can observe, in sharp contrast to the Great Depression, 
how a fierce anti-deflationary macroeconomic policy response has rapidly come to fruition in 
the OECD area. There is clear policy consensus that a Keynesian crisis should be met by an 
expansionary policy of anti-cyclical macroeconomic management across Europe. This kind of 
European policy coherence was surely lacking in the 1970s and 80s era of stagflation. Also 
the stability of the euro should not be underestimated, in that a common currency forestalls 
any policy of competitive devaluation. The internal market, enhanced in scope and strength 
by the addition to the EU of ten new members states from Central and Eastern Europe, surely 
puts a break on excessive protectionism. Last but not least, under the current financial crisis, 
it should not be forgotten that with social protection outlays averaging 28% of GDP in the 
EU,  European  social  policies  already  act  as  important  anti-cyclical  automatic  stabilizers. 
Rules  and  regulations  in  public  finances,  like  the  Stability  and  Growth  Pact,  define  all 
government expenditures as consumption. Many of the policy proposal listed below concern 
social investments with a reasonable rate of long term return for economy and society. We 
have to find a way to prioritize social investments without undermining the principles of 
sound public financing. Take social investments out of SGP rules could be a step in the right 
direction. 
    
Strengthen long-term attachment to the labor market  
The  overriding  policy  lesson  in  our  advanced  economies  is  that  in  the  face  demographic 
ageing  and  in  the  light  of  a  declining  work  force,  nobody  can  be  left  inactive  (for  long). 
Impending redundancies should be mitigated by temporary and short term unemployment 
benefits, combined with additional training measures. Any kind of job, be it short term, part-
time  or  subsidized,  is  better  than  no  job  at  all  to  forestall  unemployment  hysteresis  and 
deskilling. With ageing labour markets will be tight in the long run. The interaction between 
economic performance and the welfare state is largely mediated through the labor market. 
The majority of Europe’s Bismarck-type welfare states are confronted with a syndrome of 
labor market segmentation between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ (Schmid 2008). Relaxed hiring 
and firing legislation is best combined with generous social protection and active training and 
labour market policies to maximize employment. The ability to balance careers and family-  28
life is also crucial for removing gender biases in the labour market. While there is strong 
social security on the side of ‘guaranteed’ breadwinner workers with quasi-tenured jobs, most 
Bismarckian  welfare  states  continue  to  provide  only  inadequate  protection  for  vulnerable 
groups  such  as  young  labor  market  entrants,  women,  immigrants  and  older  low  skilled 
workers. Most likely, labor markets will become ever more flexible. While the boundaries 
between being ‘in’ and ‘out’ of work have been blurred by increases in atypical work, low-
wages, subsidized jobs, and training programs, one job is no longer enough to keep low-
income families out of poverty. Post-industrial job growth is highly biased in favor of high 
skill jobs. However, increased labor market flexibility, together with the continuous rise in 
female employment will, in addition, also encourage the growth of a sizeable amount of low 
skill  and  semi-skilled  jobs  in  the  social  sector  and  in  personal  services.  The  Bismarckian 
policy challenge is how to mitigate the emergence of new forms of labor market segmentation 
through what could be called ‘preventive employability’, combining increases in flexibility in 
labor relations by way of relaxing dismissal protection, while generating a higher level of 
security for employees in flexible jobs. Flexible working conditions are often part and parcel 
of family friendly employment policy provisions. There is a clear relation between the ratio of 
part-time jobs and female employment growth. But the ability of part-time employment to 
harmonize careers with family depends very much on employment regulation, whether part-
time  work  is  recognized  as  a  regular  job  with  basic  social  insurance  participation,  and 
whether it offers possibilities for career mobility. 
 
Active family investment strategy  
The revolution in women’s role remains incomplete, raising new welfare problems, that need 
to  be  addressed.  Depressed  female  participation  widens  the  gender  gap  and  constrains 
economic  growth.  Moreover,  also  fertility  hinges  on  effective  gender  equality.  Generous 
parental  leave,  employment  security,  and,  especially,  high  quality  child  care,  in  turn, 
positively  affects  long  term  productivity  through  higher  fertility,  higher  female  earnings, 
more  tax  revenue,  and  better  skills  on  the  part  of  future  generations,  thus  significantly 
mitigating the adverse effects of population ageing.  The Bismarckian welfare state still have 
to  adjust  to  the  feminization  of  post-industrial  labour  markets.  As  inequalities  widen, 
parents’ ability to invest in their children’s success is also becoming more unequal. Since life 
chances are so strongly determined by what happens in childhood, a comprehensive child 
investment strategy is imperative. Inaccessible childcare will provoke low fertility, low quality 
care  is  harmful  to  children,  and  low  female  employment  raises  child  poverty.  Increasing 
opportunities for women to be gainfully employed is a key step. But the concept of early 
childhood  development  needs  to  go  beyond  the  idea  that  childcare  is  necessary  to  allow   29
parents  to  reconcile  work  and  family  life.  Early  childhood  development  is  imperative  to 
ensure that children will be life-long learners and meaningful contributors to their societies.  
 
Lifelong human capital investment push 
In the new, knowledge-based economies, there is an urgent need to invest in human capital 
throughout the life of the individual. Youth with poor skills or inadequate schooling today 
will  become  tomorrow’s  precarious  worker.  Considering  the  looming  demographic 
imbalances in Europe, we cannot afford large skill deficits and high school dropout rates, 
especially in the Southern Continental welfare states (above 30 per cent in Spain, almost 25 
per cent in the Netherlands and less than 15 per cent in Denmark or Sweden). Strong social 
inheritance is not affordable in the long run. The architecture of education systems makes a 
real  difference.  High  inequality  and  high  educational  differentiation  reinforce  cognitive 
poverty, early stratification, and social segregation. Social and employment policies that are 
aimed at increasing skills and developing the quality of human resources act as ‘productive 
factors’ in our economies. The revitalization of both the Irish and the Finnish economy is in 
part based on increased investments in education, preventing early departure from formal 
education  and  training,  and  facilitating  the  transition  from  school  to  work,  in  particular 
school  leavers  with  low  qualifications.  Here  the  majority  of  Bismarckian  welfare  states 
continues to lag behind significantly. 
 
Later and flexible retirement 
As life expectancy increases and health indices improve, it will be necessary to keep older 
workers in the market for longer. Sustainable pensions will be difficult to achieve unless we 
increase employment rates of older workers and raise the retirement age to at least 67 years.  
Two trends justify an adjustment in our thinking about retirement: a) the health status of 
each elderly cohort is better than that of the last; at present a man aged 65 can look forward 
to  a  further  10  healthy  years.  And,  b)  the  gap  between  old  age  and  education  is  rapidly 
narrowing, so that old people in the future will be much better placed than now to adapt in 
the  coming  decades  with  the  aid  of  retraining  and  lifelong  learning.  The  education  gap 
between the old and the young will begin to disappear when the baby-boomers approach 
retirement. Beyond the development of multi-pillar, including both PAYGO (pay-as-you-go) 
and funded schemes, in the area of pension policy, the challenge lies in how to allocate the 
additional  expenditures  that  inevitably  accompany  population  ageing  (Myles  2002).  Of 
crucial importance remains a general, revenue financed, first tier pension guarantee with a 
price index guarantee for the next generation of flexible labor market cohorts. Sustainable 
pensions will be difficult to achieve unless we raise employment rates of older workers and 
raise  the  retirement  age  to  at  least  67  years.  Delaying  retirement  is  both  effective  and   30
equitable.  It  is  efficient  because  it  operates  simultaneously  on  the  nominator  and 
denominator:  more  revenue  intake  and  less  spending  at  the  same  time.  It  is  inter-
generationally equitable because retirees and workers both sacrifice in equal proportions. We 
are all getting healthier and more educated with each age cohort. Flexible retirement and the 
introduction of incentives to postpone retirement could greatly alleviate the pension burden. 
Although there has been a slight increase of part-time work among the elderly, it has been 
shown that part-time work and participation rates among older people are positively related; 
there  is  still  little  systematic  and  comprehensive  policy  activity  to  enhance  the  variable 
opportunity set for older workers. If older workers remain employed ten years longer than is 
now  typically  the  norm,  household  incomes  will  increase  substantially.  This  means  less 
poverty and need for social assistance and greater tax revenue. 
 
Migration and integration through participation  
Priority  should  be  given  to  problems  of  participation  and  integration  of  migrant  groups, 
whose rates of unemployment in the EU are, on average, twice that of nationals. Integration 
and immigration policy should have a central place in our discussion about the future of the 
Continental welfare state, something we failed to do in the past. In Europe’s ethnically and 
culturally  diverse  societies,  the  welfare  state  faces  a  major  challenge  in  ensuring  that 
immigrants  and  their  children  do  not  fall  behind.  Economic  exclusion  and  physical 
concentration  (ghettoization)  reinforces  educational    underperformance,  excessive 
segregation and self-destructive spirals of marginalization. 
 
Minimum income support 
We cannot assume that the measures described above will remedy current and future welfare 
deficiencies. Hence, it is impossible to avoid some form of passive minimum income support. 
An  unchecked  rise  in  income  inequality  would  worsen  citizens’  life  chances  and 
opportunities,  result  in  lost  productivity  and  more  passive  income  support  costs.  It  is, 
therefore, necessary to have an even more tightly woven net below the welfare net for the 
truly  needy  to  meet  minimum  standards  of  self-reliance.  The  key  lesson  of  the  Great 
Depression of the 1930s eventually ushered in Keynesian demand-side policies and, after a 
devastating World War, firmly established the need for some sort of safety net in every major 
industrial democracy. This lesson to match social promotion with social protection continues 
to stand tall. 
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